A Summary. . .

Three out of the last four postings have been tied together by the common theme of consciousness.

Those posts include:

The Ramblings of a Rutgers Philosophy Student. . .

From One Story to the Next. . .

A Sense or Usage of the phrase "Becoming conscious"

Together, these do offer something of value. At least, I would like to think so, and with that have decided to summarize or reiterate some of the points I made in those posts. In fact, however, as I have tried to restate the positions previously written about, they have evolved and deepened. So perhaps this is more a revision as opposed to a reiteration and it is certainly no longer a summary.

Qualia and the "knowledge argument"

Qualia and the "knowledge argument" originate at least for my purposes in the Chalmers' article, Consciousness and its Place in Nature. In fact,both entail lengthy and ongoing debates in Philosophy of Mind. At the end of the day they both are used to challenge a materialist theory of consciousness.

Qualia is often associated with Thomas Nagel's paper "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" though in fact the term is not to be found in it. In short, qualia points to the challenges or perhaps the impossibility of knowing another's subjective experiences, whether they be bats, humans or others. 

The knowledge argument centers on a scientist who has all the facts about the brain, perception, the relationship of the eye and the brain at various levels. Yet, as she is colorblind and not able to see the color red, her knowledge would be incomplete. She knows every detail regarding the processes of perception and the brain - all the physical facts, and yet as she is colorblind she cannot possibly have complete knowledge of perception. She does not know the color red. She is not able to deduct or infer to the color red.

With that, for Chalmers and others, materialism is false. Here is this scientist with all the physical facts regarding perception and yet she does not know the experience of red. Likewise with the bat, as we are not bats and do not experience the life of a bat, we cannot know what it is like to be a bat. Both the scientist in relation to her "red" experience, and we in relation to bats are missing key pieces of knowledge. We or at least the scientist are missing the experiences of both red and bats despite the knowledge that we have. 

For me the qualia and the "knowledge argument" come down to our inability to experience - even with all the facts. Whether it be a feeling or sensation or the experience of another, we are just unable to bootstrap from material facts to experience. We cannot substitute physical facts for experience and it is this which causes problems for any materialist theory of consciousness. In short, these arguments suggest that no materialist theory of consciousness will ever be able to provide an explanation of the experience of consciousness. 

Qualia and the "knowledge argument" do lead to epistemic questions

The problem that both of these point to is a challenge to any theory of consciousness, materialist or otherwise. We can certainly develop a theory of our mental, emotional, and intellectual states. Regardless of its strength, however, it will not allow us to deduct or infer to subjective experience - i.e. consciousness. In the end that experience of consciousness, accepting the above arguments and thought experiments, is subjective and largely unknowable.

To say that something is unknowable does bring us to epistemology - to what it means or what is required to know something. I am intrigued with the prospect that there is something that is unknowable. There might be something that is hard to grasp, a puzzle or mystery, which is simply beyond us. In short, most things with enough time and money, we would like to think, can be known. To say, however, that something is unknowable is to say that it is different in kind. We can somehow grasp or glimpse it but apparently nothing more. and this is the case with subjectivity.

To say that a large chunk of human experience is unknowable is amazing. It is provocative, and we should not stop there. This should be properly broadened to the nature of conscious life - human and animal. It is this that we are suggesting is unknowable.

Now I disagree that there is a component of consciousness which is unknowable. This may be controversial, but there really is no mystery here. Look again at the bat. Can we not make some guesses about their lives and even experiences. And I think we can more than guess. Can we not feel sympathy, sadness, even joy with them? Isn't that what the cable channel the Animal Planet brings to us - that these creatures, bats and animals in general are not that far removed from us? It may be a challenge to confirm that these sympathies are true but they are there. And I feel that the more we know of them, the more facts and "knowledge' we have, the more able we are to understand and sympathize with them. It may not be a deductive argument but there is something there.

Jump to the colorblind scientist. First off I have to suggest that her knowledge will never be complete even if she were not colorblind. Further the colorblindness may in fact open up or allow her to ask other questions - to see things that her peers with regular vision do not see, whether that be in front of them or in relation to the various theories and observations they are making regarding this domain. Even if it is not helpful, like any disability, one learns to work around it. Like the stroke victim who now has parts of his vision impaired, he or she comes to know to look around that patch. 

With that, I suggest two responses:

1. The first is to reject that consciousness is subjective and that experience is a deal breaker for any materialist theory of consciousness. Experience is a deal breaker only if it is subjective, but consciousness is not subjective. 
2. And number two is that epistemology must factor in or incorporate some account of experience or consciousness. The scientist's experience of red, though perhaps not subjective, needs to be richer than merely an observation or confirmation of the theories she holds to be true. This second point would no doubt become that much easier if experience and consciousness  were again devoid of subjectivity.

Two senses of the word "consciousness"

So if subjectivity is not the essence of consciousness, nor the stumbling block that is suggested, than what is consciousness. It simply becomes a massive research challenge with researchers of various stripes attacking it. These include Neuroscience, CS and AI folks, cognitive scientists, and the like. That said, and despite my lack of reading on the subject, I still want to offer two thoughts here, Both really not that controversial and complement my offerings above. 

I did in A Sense or Usage of the phrase "Becoming conscious" offer up this idea of a sense or usage, which was introduced to me way back in Philosophy 101. I want to rely on that approach here again and offer up two senses of the word "consciousness". I am not meticulously sticking to that method, but none the less I think I can point to two usages of the word. 

So the first is simply a "stream of consciousness". There are massive amounts of data that the brain processes. In fairness there is a lot that it is assumed processed, but probably not. The data however and information that is in fact process is massive and the sources numerous. Language just scratches the surface, There is tactile, audio, visual and various internal sources, meta-data and various other types of processed data. All rely on various data streams and likewise sources of those streams, whether they be our fingers, ears, or parts of the brain. 

Further, we are not conscious of all streams. Far more is dealt with without us even considering it. It is much like a computer's OS, which has an amazing number of scripts and processes that we have little or no knowledge of, and yet are able to use and take advantage of it in numerous ways. So these streams allow for the proper functioning of the whole system, which is very much a Neumannesque architecture or Turing machine, but all neurologically based. 

Now these streams could provide an alternative explanation of why our knowledge gives little insight into colors percieved or the like. It turns out what is percieved and what is known are two different streams. That needs more elaboration, but it is probably tied to a story about how that gulf between conscious and subconscious is bridged.  

It is here that I appeal to my second sense - the "Aha moment", (which is not to be confused in anyway with the 80's band A-ha). This piece I have elaborated in at least two of my previous posts. In a nutshell, most of the processing is done without our awareness. There are moments, however, when we do become conscious of something. 

Traditionally these are moments when homunculi and other "ghosts in the machine" are suggested or hinted at. Of course we want to find a solution to this without reliance on such explanations, but for the moment I just want to just point to those moments when we become conscious. They are fight or flight moments-often involving novel thoughts, perceptions, and behavior. We are jarred to consciousness. And it these moments when we do see red that we feel the most alive. 

Evolution and Consciousness:

Lastly, these two senses, which do need some more flesh and bones no doubt, lead me to two final thoughts. 

The first is that we are left with a functional system that has evolved from a small limited  set of original functions and related streams to a very rich robust range of possibilities. The crown of which is consciousness, allowing us even more reach because of this ability to tap into existing streams, functions, and data sets in ever new and useful ways, The richness and multitude of the streams we now have access to provide us with so much more than just the original options of fight or flight. 

I am especially intrigued with the evolutionary value of jokes and metaphors. For me these were the original aha moments I was referencing. As Eminem says, much is said in jest. Our ability to see and grasp humor and see something different from the intended is a key to consciousness. To grasp more fully what these are, how they work, what they entail could be very useful to an evolutionary tale of consciousness. 

Lastly, we need to review our epistemic tenets, our theories of what knowledge is and entails. Like our option of fight or flight, our theories of knowledge require amendment. Much of what we hold to be knowledge, or forget knowledge, what is in those data-streams, may or may not be true or justified. Yet that is what we hold knowledge to be. The hint of the story offered above and the mix of AI, neuroscience and cognitive science that lead to such require an update of our theories of knowledge. Ideally one that does allows access to others and further allows for jokes and metaphor.